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The False Claims Act and the
Proposed Program Fraud Civil
Remedies Act: Complementary
Partners in the Prevention
of Federal Program Fraud
INTRODUCTION
"'When the Almighty himself condescends to address man-
kind in their own language, his meaning, luminous as it must
be, is rendered dim and doubtful by the cloudy medium through
which it is communicated.' The will of Congress is no less
subject to inevitable distortion by reason of the inadequate
medium through which it must be communicated." '
Although much attention has recently been given to the loss
of federal funds due to fraud,2 the problem is not new to the
United States Government. In fact, it was during the Civil War
that Congress, reacting to reports of widespread fraud, corrup-
I Grossman v. Young, 72 F. Supp. 375, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (citing THE FED-
ERALtST No. 37, at 243 (J. Madison) (M. Dunne ed. 1901)).
2 In his Feb. 18, 1981 State of the Union Message on Economic Recovery,
President Reagan cited an unnamed government study estimating that "fraud may
account for anywhere from one to ten percent-as much as twenty-five billion dollars-
of federal expenditures for social programs." See 47 VITAL SPEECHEs 318, 321 (Mar. 15,
1981). But see Eagleton & Shapiro, Federal Fraud, Waste and Abuse: Causes and
Responses, 1983 Gov'T AccT. J. 1 where it is stated:
Ronald Reagan's 1980 pledge to balance the Federal Budget by eliminating
fraud, waste and mismanagement is to be categorized as both "campaign
oratory" and a pipe dream. There has never been a line item labeled
"fraud, waste and abuse" in the Federal Budget, waiting to be red-penciled.
Nor has there been any serious prospect that this complex problem could
be eradicated overnight.
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tion and abuse,3 enacted the False Claims Act.' To date, the
False Claims Act remains the Government's "principal civil fraud
statute."I
Unfortunately, while the False Claims Act has changed very
little over the last century, 6 the methods of defrauding the federal
government and the costs to the taxpayer have increased dra-
matically. 7 Responding to the challenge presented by federal
program abuse, government lawyers have encountered obstacles
in applying the False Claims Act." Early decisions, construing
This bill has been prepared at the urgent solicitation of the officers who
are connected with the administration of the War Department and the
Treasury Department. The Country, as we know, has been full of com-
plaints respecting the frauds and corruptions practiced in obtaining pay
from the Government during the present War ....
CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess. 952, 952 (1863)(statement of Sen. Howard intro-
ducing the False Claims Act).
Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696.
1 REPORT To THE CONGRESS By THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES, FRAUD IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS: How EXTENSIVE IS IT? How CAN IT BE
CONTROLLED? 32 (1981) [hereinafter cited as REPORT To THE CONGREss]. Former Attor-
ney General William Saxbe described the False Claims Act as "the most important tool"
in the Justice Department's fight against fraud. See 1975 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 68.
Other remedies include the recently adopted Civil Money Penalties Law of 1981,
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (1982), designed specifically to address fraud in the federal health
care financing programs. For a thorough discussion of this act, see Kusserow, Civil
Money Penalties Law of 1981: A New Effort to Confront Fraud and Abuse in Federal
Health Care Programs, 58 NOTRE DAME LAW. 985 (1982-83). See also Note, The Federal
False Claims Act: A Potential Deterrent to Medicaid Fraud and Abuse, 5 FORDHAM.
URB. L.J. 493 (1976-77).
28 U.S.C. § 2514 (1982) gives the United States Court of Claims power to levy
forfeitures for "any practices or attempts to practice any fraud against the United States
in the proof, statement, establishment or allowance [of a claim]." See O'Brien Gear &
Mach. Co. v. United States, 591 F.2d 666, 671-76 (Ct. Cl, 1979).
The False Claims Act does not abrogate the right of the Government to pursue
its common law remedies for fraud. United States v. Borin, 209 F.2d 145, 148 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied 348 U.S. 821 (1954).
6 See notes 26-29 infra and accompanying text discussing recent changes in the
Act.
, The Comptroller General has pointed out that measuring fraud only in terms
of dollars lost fails to account for its significant nonmonetary effects. The perception,
valid or not, that the public can deceive the Government without fear of being repri-
manded undermines public confidence in the Government's ability to manage its pro-
grams effectively. See REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 5, at 15.
129 CONG. REC. S9491-92 (daily ed. June 29, 1983)(statement of Sen. Roth
explaining that the False Claims Act's limitations require new administrative remedies
for fraud).
1984-19851 FALSE CLAIMS ACT
the Act narrowly as penal, 9 now conflict with more modern
needs for a remedial'0 civil statute. Consequently, the Justice
Department has been limited to pursuing only those instances of
fraud in which the Government "has suffered substantial and
identifiable monetary loss.""
Application of established rules of statutory construction in
a more consistent manner may remove some of the confusion,' 2
thereby offering a more certain judicial remedy. However, not
all the confusion can be addressed in this fashion. Therefore,
this Note will suggest possible amendments to the False Claims
Act.
In addition, a recently introduced administrative mechanism
allowing affected agencies to impose civil monetary penalties for
fraud will be analyzed and strongly recommended. Enactment
of this administrative remedy entitled the Program Fraud Civil
Remedies Act of 1985, '3 will launch a three-pronged attack in-
cluding judicial, administrative and private14 remedies on dis-
In United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 598-99 (1958), the Court explained
that in an action for civil penalties under former § 231 [now 31 U.S.C. § 37291, the
term "claim" was to be strictly construed so as not to include an application for loan
insurance because the statute providing the penalties incorporated criminal sanctions as
tests for liability. Thus, such a statute must be carefully restricted to its literal terms.
See note 47 infra for a definition of a "penal" statute.
'1 In United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232-33 (1968), the Court
held that the False Claims Act was "remedial" and therefore should not be read narrowly
to include only a demand based on the Government's liability. In the Court's view, the
Act should apply to all fraudulent attempts to cause the Government to pay out money.
See also United States v. Alperstein, 183 F. Supp. 548, 550-52 (S.D. Fla. 1960) aff'd
291 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1961) (false claim not confined to a claim for money or property
but comprehends a claim for valuable services). See note 58 infra for the definition of
a remedial statute. See generally Note, The Federal False Claims Act: A "Remedial"
Alternative for Protecting the Government from Fraudulent Practices, 52 S. CAL. L.
REV. 159 (1978-79) (providing an excellent discussion of the distinctions between "penal"
and "remedial" statutes).
129 CONG. REc. S9491-92 (daily ed. June 29, 1983) (statement of Sen. Roth).
,2 Recent commentators have suggested that reading the statute in light of its
"remedial" purpose brings clarity to the sometimes confusing case law interpreting the
statute. See, e.g., Note, supra note 10, at 178 ("The major flaw in the line of cases that
has strictly construed 'claims' to include only 'demands for money or property' is that
this interpretation frustrates the remedial purpose of the Act.").
1 See S. 1134, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S6248-54 (daily ed. May
15, 1985). For a complete discussion of this proposed legislation see notes 139-78 infra
and accompanying text.
" One of the unique aspects of the False Claims Act is the qui tam action, defined
as:
An action brought by an informer, under a statute which establishes a
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honest dealings with the federal government. In this manner,
Congress may not only recover lost dollars but also prevent a
"loss of confidence in the government's ability to effectively
and efficiently manage its programs.""
I. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
A. Historical Background
As originally enacted in 1863, the False Claims Act imposed
both criminal and civil penalties on any person, whether military
personnel or civilian, who made false or fraudulent claims against
the Government during times of war.' 6 The Revised Statutes of
penalty for the commission or omission of a certain act, and provides that
the same shall be recoverable in a civil action, part of the penalty to go
to any person who will bring such action and the remainder to the state
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1126 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). Under the present statute, 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(a), (b)(l)-(2) (1982), a plaintiff can proceed with a civil action only after sub-
mitting the evidence underlying the action to the Attorney General. If the Government
fails to intervene or intervenes but fails to proceed with reasonable diligence, the plaintiff
can then proceed with the qui tam action. Otherwise, the plaintiff's private action is
barred and the Government will proceed with the action. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(3).
Prior to 1943, plaintiffs could base civil actions against defendants solely on
information obtained from government documents or even criminal indictments. In 1943
the Supreme Court in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 542 (1943),
upheld the right to proceed with a qui tam action even though all the plaintiff's
information was obtained directly from the Government. Congress quickly responded
by amending the statute to its present form. See Act of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, 57 Stat.
608. See note 31 infra for the text of the present statute granting private plaintiffs
standing.
According to one commentator, this amendment was clearly aimed at restricting
the qui tam provisions of the statute to allow for private actions only when the
government had no prior knowledge of the fraud. As a result, the qui tam action may
not be an ineffective tool for the private plaintiff. See Comment, Qui Tam Actions:
The Role of the Private Citizen in Law Enforcement, 20 UCLA L. REv. 778, 793-94
(1972-73) [hereinafter cited as Qui Tam Actions]. Cf. Comment, Qui Tam Suits Under
the Federal False Claims Act: Tool of the Private Litigant in Public Actions, 67 Nw.
U.L. REV. 446 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Private Litigant] (qui tam actions are poten-
tially an effective method for public interest groups to use in recovering abused or
misapplied public funds. For a further discussion of the private suit under the False
Claims Act see notes 30-35 infra and accompanying text.
" See REPORT To THE CONGRESS, supra note 5, at 15.
'1 Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696-99. Sections one and two subjected
military personnel to fines, imprisonment and even court-martial for presenting false or
fraudulent claims to the Government. Section three subjected civilians to a $2,000
forfeiture and double damages for committing any of the acts proscribed by sections
one and two. In addition, the civilian could be fined and imprisoned.
FALsE CLAIMS ACT
1874'7 split the original False Claims Act into two sections.
Revised Statutes section 543818 imposed criminal liability, includ-
ing fines and imprisonment, on anyone presenting fraudulent
claims to the Government in the manner proscribed by the
original act.' 9 Revised Statutes section 349020 subjects civilians
to the same $2,000 forfeitures and double damages found in the
orginal Act2' for committing any of the acts punishable under
criminal section 5438.22 Although section 5438 was later re-
pealed,2 3 the tests of liability found in that provision continued
to be incorporated by reference into the civil provisions of the
1 The Revised Statutes of 1874, approved by the Act of June 20, 1874, ch. 333,
18 Stat. 113, expressly overruled and repealed their original Statutes at Large texts.
Thus, laws found in the Revised Statutes are the authoritative text and are considered
legal evidence of the law (positive law) unless they are subsequently reenacted as one of
the "positive law" titles of the United States Code. Until enactment as a positive law,
United States Code provisions remain only prima facie evidence of the law. 1 U.S.C. §
204(a) (1982). See also COHEN & BERRY, How To FIND THE LAW 189-90 (West 1983).
11 REv. STAT. § 5438 (1874) provided in pertinent part:
Every person who makes or causes to be made, or presents or causes to
be presented, for payment or approval, to or by any person or officer in
the civil, military, or naval service of the United States, any claim upon
or against the Government of the United States ... knowing such claim
to be false ... or who ... causes to be made ... any false bill ... or
who enters into agreement ... to defraud the Government ... or who,
having charge ... of any money ... conceal[s] such money ... shall be
imprisoned at hard labor for not less than one nor more than five years,
or fined not less than one thousand dollars nor more than five thousand
dollars.
1" Id. Compare REV. STAT. § 5438 with Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, § 1, 12 Stat.
696.
" REV. STAT. § 3490 (1874) provided in pertinent part:
Any person ... who shall do or commit any of the acts prohibited by any
of the provisions of section fifty-four hundred and thirty-eight, Title
"Crimes," shall forfeit and pay to the United States the sum of two
thousand dollars, and, in addition, double the amount of damages which
the United States may have sustained ....
Id. Compare REv. STAT. § 3490 with Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, § 3, 12 Stat.
696.
See note 18 supra for the text of § 5438.
-' REV. STAT. § 5438 was repealed by Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 341, 35
Stat. 1153, and reenacted as part of the Criminal Code by the Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch.
321, § 35, 35 Stat. 1095. In 1948, § 35 of the Criminal Code was revised and reenacted
into positive law as 18 U.S.C. § 287 (false claims) and 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (false statements)
by the Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 698, 749. 18 U.S.C. §§ 287, 1001 have
not been amended since 1948. See generally Gondelman, False Claims Against the
Government: Defense Tactics in a False Claims Prosecution, 17 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 399
(1980).
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False Claims Act. 24 It was this anomalous situation, where civil
damages were imposed under section 3490 for conduct punish-
able as a crime under former section 5438, that led to the
confusion in interpreting the False Claims Act. 25
B. The False Claims Act Today
In 1982, former sections 231-35 of the False Claims Act 26
were recodified and reenacted in 31 U.S.C. sections 3729-3731.27
Though unchanged in substance from the prior codification, 28
2' The tests of liability found in REV. STAT. § 5438 continued to be incorporated
into REV. STAT. § 3490 despite the repeal of § 5438, thus following the general rule that
the adoption of a statute by reference is an adoption of the law as it existed at the time
the adopting statute was passed. Therefore, the adopting statute is not affected by any
subsequent amendment or repeal of the adopted statute. Rainwater v. United States,
356 U.S. 590 (1958). See generally Annot., 2 L. Ed. 2d 2048 (1958)(discussing the effect
of modification or repeal of statutory provision adopted by reference in another provi-
sion).
2- Compare United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 313 n.8 (1976) ("[lIln
construing § 5438 we are actually construing the provisions of a criminal statute. Such
provisions must be carefully restricted. . . ." (citing United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S.
at 598.)) with United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232 (1968) ("[lin the
various contexts in which questions of the proper construction of the Act have been
presented, the Court has consistently refused to accept a rigid, restrictive reading, even
at the time when the statute imposed criminal sanctions as well as civil.").
26 Prior to 1982, the language of the False Claims Act could be found in 31 U.S.C.
§§ 231-235 (1976), but since title 31 had not been enacted into positive law, the official
text remained a significantly different version found in the Revised Statutes of 1874,
Sections 3490-3494. See United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. at 305 n.1; United States
v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. at 228-29 n.1.
., See Act of Sept. 13, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-258, 96 Stat. 978-79 (codified as
enacted at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1982). See note 17 supra discussing the effect of
enacting title 31 into positive law. Criminal provisions contained in the original act are
now codified in 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1982) (false claims) and 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982) (false
statements). For purposes of this Note, any reference to the False Claims Act will include
only its civil provisions.
2 The House Report accompanying the enactment into positive law of 31 U.S.C.
§§ 3729-3731 (1982) makes it clear that no substantive changes were intended: "The
purpose of [Pub. L. No. 97-2581 ... is to restate in comprehensive form, without
substantive change, certain general and permanent laws related to money and finance
and to enact those laws as title 31, United States Code. In the restatement, simple
language has been substituted for awkward and obsolete terms .... " H.R. REP. No.
651, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1895
(emphasis added). However, it could be argued that with the reenactment of REV. STAT.
§ 3490 (1874), in the language of 31 U.S.C. 3729, courts are no longer interpreting a
criminal statute incorporated by reference into the False Claims Act. Such an argument
could be used to support a broad construction of the Act. See notes 59-86 infra and
accompanying text. But see Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36, 44 (1983)
(relevant legislative intent is that of the enacting Congress).
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the present version presents, in a more organized, readable fash-
ion, the types of conduct punishable under the statute.2 9
As did old section 232, 30 section 3730 grants the United States
Attorney General and private plaintiffs the right to bring civil
actions against those who violate the provisions of section 3729. 3'
However, the right of the private plaintiff to proceed with the
action is limited by requiring that all material evidence first be
turned over to the Government, 32 thereby permitting assurance
31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1982) provides:
A person not a member of an armed force of the United States is liable
to the United States Government for a civil penalty of $2,000, an amount
equal to 2 times the amount of damages the Government sustains, because
of the act of that person, and costs of the civil action, if that person-
(1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or
employee of the Government or a member of an armed force a false
or fraudulent claim for payment or approval;
(2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false
record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved;
(3) conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraud-
ulent claim allowed or paid;
(4) has possession, custody, or control of public property or money
used, or to be used, in an armed force and intending to defraud the
Government or willfully to conceal the property, delivers, or causes to
be delivered, less property than the amount for which the person
receives a certificate or receipt;
(5) authorized to make or deliver a document certifying receipt of
property used, or to be used, in an armed force and, intending to
defraud the Government, makes or delivers the receipt without com-
pletely knowing that the information on the receipt is true; or
(6) knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation or debt,
public property from a member of an armed force who lawfully may
not sell or pledge the property.
See 31 U.S.C. § 232 (1976).
" 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a)-(b)(1) (1982) provides in part:
(a) The Attorney General diligently shall investigate a violation under
section 3729 of this title. If the Attorney General finds that a person has
violated or is violating section 3729, the Attorney General may bring a
civil action under this section against the person ....
(b)(1) A person may bring a civil action for a violation of section 3729 of
this title for the person and for the United States Government. The action
shall be brought in the name of the Government. The district courts of
the United States have jurisdiction of the action. Trial is in the judicial
district within whose jurisdictional limits the person charged with a viola-
tion is found or the violation occurs. An action may be dismissed only if
the Court and the Attorney General give written consent and their reasons
for consenting.
'! See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2),(3) (1982) which provides:
(2) A copy of the complaint and written disclosure of substantially all
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that the private plaintiff's information was not obtained from
the Government.13 If the Government proceeds with the action,
the informer may be awarded up to ten percent (10%) of the
amount collected. 34 If the Government fails to proceed, as much
as twenty-five percent (25%) of any award may be retained by
the private plaintiff. 35
Section 3731 retains, with only minor revisions, the six year
statute of limitations found in the earlier version) 6
II. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT
Analysis of any statute must begin with a careful reading of
the statutory language.37 Even where an act is clear and unam-
biguous on its face, it may be necessary to examine relevant
legislative history to be certain that the measure accurately re-
flects the will of Congress. 38 Unfortunately, courts have found
material evidence and information the person possesses shall be served on
the Government under rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (28
App. U.S.C.). The Government may proceed with the action by entering
an appearance by the 60th day after being notified. The person bringing
the action may proceed with the action if the Government-
(a) by the end of the 60 day period does not enter, or gives written
notice to the court of intent not to enter the action; or
(b) does not proceed with the action with reasonable diligence within
6 months after entering an appearance, or within additional time the
court allows after notice.
(3) If the Government proceeds with the action, the action is conducted
only by the Government. The Government is not bound by an act of the
person bringing the action.
33 Cf. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4) (1982) ("Unless the Government proceeds with the
action, the court shall dismiss an action brought by the person on discovering the action
is based on evidence or information the Government had when the action was brought.").
For a discussion of the history of the qui tam action, see note 14 supra.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1) (1982).
' 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2) (1982). Note that the court may award the private plaintiff
expenses necessarily incurred in bringing the action, but in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (1982)
the Government explicitly declines any responsibility for reimbursing the private plaintiff
for expenses incurred in bringing an action.
See 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b) (1982).
" "As is true of every case involving construction of a statute, our starting point
must be the language employed by Congress." Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330,
337 (1979).
1 See, e.g., Pettis ex rel. United States v. Morrison-Knudson Co., 577 F.2d 668,
671 (9th Cir. 1978) ("It is always possible that Congress did not quite mean what it said
and did not quite say what it meant."). See also Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest
Research Group, 426 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1976) (always examine legislative history for the
intent of Congress).
FALSE CLAIMS ACT
key substantive provisions of the False Claims Act both un-
clear and ambiguous. With less than adequate legislative his-
tory to rely upon,3 9 courts depend on other rules of statutory
construction to aid them in divining legislative intent. 40 What
follows is an examination of the rules of statutory construction4'
applied to various substantive and procedural aspects of the
statute.
42
A. What Constitutes a "Claim" Within the Meaning
of the Act?
The False Claims Act imposes liability on any person knowingly
presenting a "false or fraudulent claim for payment or ap-
proval. ' 43 Unfortunately, the term "claim" is undefined in the
Act,"4 leaving courts with little guidance as to how it should be con-
strued. Historically, courts have focused on the character of the
statute to determine whether to give the term "claim" either a strict4
11 Noticeably absent from the debate surrounding passage of the original False
Claims Act is any discussion of what constitutes a "claim" against the federal govern-
ment. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess. 952-58 (1863). See also United States v.
Hibbs, 568 F.2d 347, 350 (1977) ("There is little help in the way of legislative history
and there are few cases interpreting the [False Claims Act's] broad language.").
- Justice O'Connor has described the act of statutory construction in the following
manner: "As with many other narrow issues of statutory construction, the general
language chosen by Congress does not clearly resolve the precise question. Our polestar,
however, must be the intent of Congress, and the guiding lights are the language,
structure, and legislative history [of the Act]." Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax
Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1107-08
(1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Courts have made clear that the relevant legislative
intent is that of the Congress which originally enacted the statute. See Watt v. Western
Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36, 44 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S.
30, 56 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
41 Statutory construction has been defined as the process of determining the mean-
ing of a statute by drawing conclusions about what is not directly stated in the text
from elements found in the text. See United States v. Farenholt, 206 U.S. 226, 229-30
(1907). See 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 311 at 529-30 (1953).
4- See Note, supra note 10, at 165-93 for a thorough analysis applying rules of
statutory construction to the False Claims Act.
4, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(1) (1982). See note 29 supra for the text of the statute.
See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
4, Strict construction of a statute involves a close adherence to the literal interpre-
tation of its langauge. See, e.g., Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590, 592 (1958)
(False Claims Act is penal and therefore entitled to a strict construction closely adhering
1984-1985]
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or a liberal4 constructon.
Those courts focusing on the punitive or penal47 character
of the Act tend to narrowly confine its purposes. In United
States v. Cohn,41 the defendant made application for delivery of
nondutiable merchandise which was merely in possession of a
United States Customs official as bailee.4 9 Holding that the
criminal provisions of the False Claims Act were not applicable
to this situation 50 the Supreme Court stressed the need to strictly
construe "claims" under the statute to include only those based
on a demand "for money or property ... based upon the
Government's own liability to the claimant."'"
Applying this same strict construction in a civil context, the
Supreme Court in United States v. McNinch 2 held that the
submission of a fraudulent application for credit insurance from
the Federal Housing Administration did not involve a demand
for money or property owed by the Government to the claimant
and, thus, did not constitute a "claim" within the meaning of
the Act. 3 The Court acknowledged that such an application
could be regarded as a "claim" in the sense that the applicant
to its literal terms because the civil portions of the Act incorporate criminal tests for
liability). See generally 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 311 at 530-31 (1953).
*6 A liberal construction gives statutory language its generally accepted meaning
so that the most comprehensive application may be accomplished without doing violence
to the language used. United States v. Peter Kiewit & Sons' Co., 235 F. Supp. 500, 502
(D. Alaska 1964). See, e.g., United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. at 233 (quoting
Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. at 592) ("[O]bjective of Congress ... 'was broadly
to protect the funds and property of the government, . . . and . . .' [b]y any ordinary
standard the language of the Act is certainly comprehensive enough to achieve this
purpose."). See generally 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 387 (1953).
11 Penal statutes are those which impose punishment for committing a crime against
the state. Those punishments may include penalties or forfeitures as well as imprison-
ment. United States v. Witherspoon, 211 F.2d 858, 861 (6th Cir. 1954). See generally
82 C.J.S. Statutes § 389 (1953); Note, supra note 10, at 173-78.
270 U.S. 339 (1926).
Id. at 343-44.
See id. at 345-46. The defendant, Cohn, was being prosecuted under § 35 of
the Criminal Code for fraudulently attempting to procure from customs house officials
possession of foreign-made cigars without the proper bill of lading and attached draft.
See note 18 supra for the Criminal Code. See note 23 supra for a discussion of the
statutory history of the criminal provisions of the False Claims Act.
270 U.S. at 345-46.
356 U.S. 595 (1958).
Id. at 598-99 (citing United States v. Tieger, 234 F.2d 589, 591 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 941 (1956)); Accord United States v. Cohn, 270 U.S. 339, 345. Cohn
was cited with approval by the MeNinch court as relevant though Cohn did arise in a
somewhat different context. See 356 U.S. at 600 n.10.
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had a right or privilege to draw on the Government's credit but
opted for a stricter interpretation because:
[Ilt must be kept in mind, as we explained in Rainwater[5
that in determining the meaning of the words "claim against
the Government" we are actually construing the provisions of
a criminal statute. Such provisions must be carefully restricted,
not only to their literal terms but to the evident purpose of
Congress in using those terms, particularly where they are
broad and susceptible to numerous definitions."-
The Court clearly applied the rule that all penal statutes should
be strictly construed to insure that no individual is convicted
without fair warning and prior notice regarding what conduct
will be punishable.-
Thus, in cases where the character and objective of the
statute are considered penal, courts restrict the statute to its
literal terms.17 However, those courts focusing on the "remedial' '51
or "restitutionary" character of the statute tend to interpret it
more comprehensively. 59
This broader view was first expounded in United States ex
rel Marcus v. Hess.60 In this 1943 opinion, the Supreme Court
'I Rainwater v. United States, 356 U.S. 590 (1958), decided the same day as
McNinch, held that because the civil provisions of the False Claims Act incorporated
the criminal provisions of REv. STAT. § 5438 (1874) as the test for civil liability, the
statute was penal and therefore to be confined in scope to its literal terms. Id. at 592-
93.
356 U.S. at 598.
See Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 375 (1973);
McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931). This interpretation of the False Claims
Act does have some basis in legislative history. As one legislator stated: "IL]egislation,
and especially criminal legislation, must have for its object, not the conviction of the
guilty, but the protection of the innocent." CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess. 952,
954 (statement of Sen. Cowan).
" See Olson v. Mellon, 4 F. Supp. 947 (W.D. Pa. 1933), aff'd sub non. United
States ex rel. Knight v. Mellon, 71 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir. 1933) (False Claims Act held
penal in nature and not to be enlarged by implication); United States v. Kansas Pac.
Ry., 26 F. Cas. 680 (D. Kan. 1877) (because REv. STAT. § 3490 incorporates by reference
REV. STAT. § 5438, it is penal in nature and must be given a strict construction).
" A remedial statute is one which seeks to provide a remedy to redress an existing
grievance and is generally interpreted liberally. In re Carlson, 292 F. Supp. 778, 784
(C.D. Cal. 1968).
' See, e.g., United States v. Niefert-White Co., 390 U.S. at 233 ("This remedial
statute reaches beyond 'claims' which might be legally enforced, to all fraudulent
attempts to cause the Government to pay out sums of money."). See generally 82 C.J.S.
Statutes § 388 at 918-20 (1984); Note, supra note 10, at 173-78.
"' 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
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held that contracts fraudulently obtained by collusive bidding
gave rise to "claims" within the meaning of the False Claims
Act. 6' Rejecting the lower court's determination that qui tam
actions must be interpreted with utmost strictness, 62 the Court
found that the chief purpose of the False Claims Act was to
provide restitution for the Government. 63 As a "remedial" stat-
ute, it was entitled to a liberal interpretation, giving it "the fair
meaning of its intendment."64
Marcus was a significant step toward a more liberal inter-
pretation of the statute. The issue before the Court was whether
a qui tam action to recover the statutory forfeiture and double
damages under the civil section of the False Claims Act violated
the fifth amendment double jeopardy clause when the defendant
had already pled nolo contendere in a prior criminal action for
the same offenses. 6 The Court rejected the double jeopardy
defense citing a recent opinion in which they "emphasized the
1' Id. at 542-44. But see United States ex ret. Brensilber v. Bausch & Lomb Optical
Co., 131 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1942), aff'd, 320 U.S. 711 (1943) (per curiam by an equally
divided Court). In Brensilber, decided only months after the Marcus decision, the
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's determination that collusive bidding was not
a violation of the Act. Relying in part on the Third Circuit's opinion in United States
ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 127 F.2d 233, the Second Circuit considered the False Claims
Act to be "not only penal, but drastically penal . . . (citations omitted). For this reason
it has been strictly construed . .. (citations omitted). Furthermore, so far as it perpetuates
the odious and happily nearly obsolete qui tam action, it should be regarded with
particular jealousy." 131 F.2d at 547. The affirmance of the Second Circuit opinion,
albeit by an equally divided Court, remains an apparent contradiction in the mind of
the Court.
In a later opinion, the Second Circuit reconciled the two holdings by pointing out
that in Marcus, the defendants had created the false impression that bidding was
competitive by submitting inflated bids. In Brensilber, according to the court, there was
no implied representation that the bids were competitive in price. The defendants simply
failed to bid. Thus, no fraud was ever proven and the action under the False Claims
Act could not be maintained. United States ex rel. Weinstein v. Bressler, 160 F.2d 403
(2d Cir. 1947).
See 127 F.2d at 235.
"' "We think the chief purpose of the statutes here was to provide for restitution
to the government of money taken from it by fraud, and that the device of double
damages plus a specific sum was chosen to make sure that the government would be
made completely whole." 317 U.S. at 551-52.
317 U.S. at 542 (citation omitted).
' Another issue before the Court which sparked a great deal of controversy was
the right of the informer to bring a qui tam action using only information acquired
from the Government's indictment in the criminal action. The Court upheld the right
of the private plaintiff. See note 14 supra for a discussion of Congress' response to this
holding.
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line between civil, 'remedial' actions brought primarily to protect
the government from financial loss and actions intended to
authorize criminal punishment to vindicate public justice. Only
the latter subject the defendant to 'jeopardy' within the consti-
tutional meaning. ' ' 66 Concluding that double damages and a
$2,000 forfeiture were remedial in nature, 67 the Court pointed
out that the civil remedies under the Act do not lose the quality
of a civil action simply because more than a precise amount of
actual damages is recovered. 61
However, the impact of Marcus on what constitutes a "claim"
within the meaning of the False Claims Act is less than clear.
While recognizing that the damages afforded the Government
were "remedial," the Court maintained that the scope of section
3490 should still be strictly construed in determining liability
because it incorporated a criminal statute by reference. 69 Thus,
according to Marcus, while the reach of the False Claims Act
might be narrow, for those activities within its grasp the damage
and forfeiture provisions are "remedial" and not "penal" and,
therefore, should be broadly construed. 70
Despite the Supreme Court's characterization of the False
Claims Act as both "penal" and "remedial" in character, Mar-
cus has been interpreted as an expansion of "false claims"
beyond the narrow "demand for money or property" test set
forth in Cohn.7' In United States ex rel. Rodriguez v. Weekly
Publications, Inc. ,72 the district court expanded the Cohn test to
include fraudulent representations which resulted in lower mail-
ing rates to post office officials. 73 Prior to this holding, courts
- 317 U.S. at 548-49 (citing Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397-98 (1938).
" See 317 U.S. at 549.
- See id. at 550. See also United States v. Ridglea State Bank, 357 F.2d 495, 497
(5th Cir. 1966); United States v. Rohleder, 157 F.2d 126, 129 (3d Cir. 1946); United
States v. Cherokee Implement Co., 212 F. Supp. 347, 375 (N.D. Iowa 1963).
- See 317 U.S. at 542. See note 24 supra and accompanying text dicussing the
relationship of sections 5438 and 3490.
" Id. "[l1n interpreting so much of [§ 5438's] language as it shares in common
with § 3490 we must give it careful scrutiny lest those be brought within its reach who
are not clearly included; but after such scrutiny we must give it the fair meaning of its
intendment." Id. (citation omitted).
See Note, supra note 10, at 166-68; Qui Tam Actions, supra note 14, at 789-
91.
68 F. Supp. 767 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
See id. at 770.
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had uniformly held that fraudulent reductions in obligations
owed to the Government were not "false claims. ' 74 Focusing on
the "remedial" nature of the statute, 75 the court, in Rodriguez,
did not require that there be a strict demand for money or
property. 76
Returning to the narrower "demand for money or property"
test, more recent court rulings have failed to find a "claim"
against the Government under facts substantially the same as
those found in Rodriguez.7 7 Apparently, the inconsistencies in
the law have left the courts confused as to how Marcus is to be
applied.
Perhaps the strongest and most liberal construction given
Marcus was in United States v. Neifert-White Co.78 The issue
for the Court in Neifert-White was whether the False Claims
Act reached "claims for favorable action by the Government
upon application for loans or [was] ... confined to 'claims' for
payments due and owing from the government." 7 9 The Supreme
Court held that a "claim" should not be construed narrowly to
include only demands for money or property based on the Gov-
ernment's liability.80 While expressly declining to overrule United
States v. McNinch,8' the Court expanded prior notions of the
Act by describing it as "intend[ing] to reach all types of fraud,
without qualification, that might result in financial loss to the
71 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Kessler v. Mercur Corp., 83 F.2d 178, 182-83
(2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 576 (improper deductions from amounts payable
to Government under lease agreement held not to be a "claim" against the Government
since Government never had a property interest in the profits collected); Olson v. Mellon,
4 F. Supp. 947 (W.D. Pa. 1933) (false federal income tax return filed to avoid tax
liability not considered a "claim" against the Government), aff'd sub nom. United States
ex rel. Knight v. Mellon (per curiam), 71 F.2d 1021 (3d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293
U.S. 615 (1934).
" See 68 F. Supp. at 769 (citing United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S.
at 540-42, 544, 549).
" See 68 F. Supp. at 770.
" See, e.g., United States v. Howell, 318 F.2d 162, 165-66 (9th Cir. 1963) (sub-
mitting of false records substantially underestimating gross receipts of business, thereby
reducing commissions owed to the Government, was not considered a claim within the
meaning of the Act); United States v. Marple Community Record, Inc., 335 F. Supp.
95, 99-100 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (defendant made no "claim" against Government by mailing
newspapers by second-class postage while not qualifying for second-class rate privileges).
390 U.S. 228 (1968).
9 390 U.S. at 230.
See 390 U.S. at 233.
See notes 52-56 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
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Government. ' 82 Thus, where the dealer furnished falsely inflated
invoices which were then used to support applications for loans
from the Commodity Credit Corporation, such action consti-
tuted a false claim.8 3
Drawing on language found in Marcus,8 4 the Court refused
to give the statute a narrow reading saying, "This remedial
statute reaches beyond 'claims' which might be legally enforce-
able, to all fraudulent attempts to cause the Government to pay
out sums of money."85 Despite this ruling, several courts still
consider the False Claims Act "penal" and narrowly interpret
what constitutes a "claim. '"86
This "narrow" view has been applied with particular con-
sistency to contingent "claims" such as applications for loan
insurance 7 and loan guarantees8 when there has been no default
390 U.S. at 232.
" Both lower court United States v. Neifert-White decisions held that the Govern-
ment had failed to make a case against the Neifert-White Co. because no "claim" had
been made against the Government based on the Government's liability to the claimant.
See 247 F. Supp. 878, 881-83 (D. Mont. 1965); 372 F.2d 372, 378 (9th Cir. 1967). Both
opinions relied heavily upon United States v. McNinch. In Neifert-White the Supreme
Court distinguished McNinch from the case before it, stating:
The Court [in McNinch] emphasized the distinction between contracts of
insurance against loss ... and transactions in which the United States pays
or lends money. For purposes of the present case, we need not reconsider
the validity of this distinction. It is sufficient to note that the instant case
involves a false statement made with the purpose and effect of inducing
the Government immediately to part with money.
390 U.S. at 232.
See 390 U.S. at 232.
" Id. at 233.
' See United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 313 n.8 (1976); United States v.
Hibbs, 568 F.2d at 350; United States ex rel. Weinburger v. Equifax, Inc., 557 F.2d
456, 460-62 (5th Cir. 1977); O'Brien Gear & Machine Co. v. United States, 591 F.2d
666, 671-76 (Ct. Cl. 1979); United States v. Lawson, 522 F. Supp. 746, 749 (D.N.J.
1981); United States ex rel. Hughes v. Cook, 498 F. Supp. 784, 786-87 (S.D. Miss.
1980).
0 See notes 52-56 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the "narrow"
approach to a "claim" in the context of an application for loan insurance.
- See United States v. Cochran, 235 F.2d 131, 134 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 941 (1956) (statute has the effect of dealing only with persons who falsely claim
money or property from the Government and a guarantee is not such a claim). United
States v. Tieger, 234 F.2d 589, 590-92 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 941 (1956)
(guarantee obligation itself does not give rise to "claim" under statute until the Gov-
ernment is required to pay). But see United States v. DeWitt, 265 F.2d 393 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 866 (1959) (loan guarantee applicant submitting false application
and receiving $160 gratuity payable out of public funds held to have made a "claim"
within the meaning of the Act).
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forcing the Government to pay.89 Here, courts have been reluc-
tant to accept what one commentator termed the "full mandate
of Marcus."9 No doubt because it so clearly excludes contingent
claims from the scope of the False Claims Act,9' McNinch has
made courts hesitant to extend the "remedial" function of the
statute to encompass guarantees.
Nevertheless, it has been argued that although a fraudulent
loan application is not literally within the meaning of "claim"
upon the Government, "a liberal interpretation of the term
'claim' would seem proper, if a strict construction tended to
contravene the purpose of the statute." 92 Apparently in partial
agreement with this broader construction, several courts, relying
on Marcus, have allowed recovery under the False Claims Act
when there has been default and a resultant demand for money
but before there has been payment on the guarantee by the
Government. 93
See United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. at 232 (fraudulent loan
application caused Government to part with money immediately); United States v.
Veneziale, 268 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1959) (fraudulent representation inducing FHA to
guarantee loan constituted a "claim" under the Act when innocent third party was paid
after default out of public money-action sustainable even though money was paid to
bank and not to defendant).
- Qui Tam Actions, supra note 14, at 791. According to this author, United States
ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, stands for the proposition that the objective of
the False Claims Act is remedial and restitutionary, and therefore should be given a fair
construction. This interpretation may not be reflective of the total opinion. See notes
69-70 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the dual nature of the False
Claims Act.
"1 See United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. at 598-99.
2 Private Litigant, supra note 14, at 461 n.73. See also United States v. McNinch,
356 U.S. at 602 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("No claim has been tendered against the
United States for 'payment.' But a claim has been presented for 'approval' in the
meaning of the Act. For the United States has been induced by fraudulent representations
to insure these loans. One who has the endorsement of the United States on his paper
has acquired property of substantial value."); United States v. Cochran, 235 F.2d at
135 (Rives, J., dissenting) ("Inducing the Government to pledge its credit by a false and
fraudulent [application] . . . seems ... as much within the False Claims Act as so
inducing it to part with its money or property."); United States v. Tieger, 234 F.2d at
595 (Biggs, C.J., dissenting) (" 'A claim, within the meaning of this statute, is the
demand of something from the United States on the ground of right, as the assertion
of a right to the title ... of property, or the affirming of a debt, obligation, or the
like.' " (quoting United States v. Byron, 223 F. 798, 800 (D. Or. 1915) (emphasis
added)); Note, supra note 10, at 183-84 ("[L]iability under the Act [should] not depend
on the success or failure of the fraud.").
1' See United States v. Ridglea State Bank, 357 F.2d 495. The court in Ridglea
also relied on the fact that the Government had incurred expenses investigating the false
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One final area of confusion concerns fraudulent demands
for government services.94 Courts are almost equally divided on
the question of whether fraudulent applications to a Veterans
Administration hospital for free hospitalization violate the Act. 95
Similarly, there is a dispute about whether fraudulent applica-
tions for feed or grain from the Commodity Credit Corporation
give rise to a "claim. ' 96 As before, each case is marked by
confusion concerning the proper construction of the False Claims
Act.
The confusion surrounding the proper construction of the
term "claim", outside the "strict demand for money or prop-
erty" context, limits the usefulness of the False Claims Act,
claim. Without any expense on the part of the Government and absent default on the
loan guaranteed, it is doubtful that the false statement alone would have been considered
a false claim. See Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 153 n.5 (1956)
("[F]ailure to show actual damages [where Government discovered fraud before pay-
ments made] would not preclude recovery under the statute." (citing Marcus)); United
States v. Hughes, 585 F.2d 284, 286 n.l (7th Cir. 1978) ("A false claim is actionable
under the Act even though the United States has suffered no measurable damages from
the claim." (citations omitted)). See also Toepleman v. United States, 263 F.2d 697 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied 359 U.S. 989 (1959).
- Some of this confusion has been addressed by the passage of the Civil Monentary
Penalties Law of 1981 which imposes civil monetary penalties for the filing of false or
otherwise improper claims in the Medicare, Medicaid or Maternal and Child Health
Services Block Grant programs. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (1982). This Act imposes a
penalty of not more than $2,000 and damages equal to not more than twice the amount
falsely or fraudulently claimed. Unlike the False Claims Act, however, this Act includes
within its prohibitions a claim for an item or service that the person knew or had reason
to know was false. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a) (1982). See generally Kusserow, supra
note 5.
" Compare United States v. Alperstein, 183 F. Supp. 548, 550-52 (D. Fla. 1960),
aff'd, 291 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1961) (false claims under Act not limited to a claim for
money or property but includes a claim for valuable services) and United States v.
Petrik, 154 F. Supp. 598, 599 (D. Kan. 1956) (defendant who fraudulently applied for
free hospitalization from Veterans' hospital made a false claim) with United States v.
Borth, 266 F.2d 521, 522-23 (10th Cir. 1959) (medical services are not the equivalent of
money or property) and United States v. Schmidt, 204 F. Supp. 540, 544 (E.D. Wis.
1962) (false statement as to applicant's ability to pay not a false claim where applicant
made full and complete disclosure of his assets). See also United States v. Shanks, 263
F. Supp. 1012, 1013 (D. Colo. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 384 F.2d 721 (10th Cir.
1967) (implication that services are not the equivalent of a claim).
Compare Fleming v. United States, 336 F.2d 475, 480 (10th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 907 (1965) (fraudulent purchase orders held to be "claims") and Sell
v. United States, 336 F.2d 467, 474 (10th Cir. 1964) (false application held to be a
claim) with United States v. Robbins, 207 F. Supp. 799, 806-07 (D. Kan. 1962) (court
equated an application for grain with the application for credit insurance in United
States v. McNinch and found application not a claim).
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inhibiting Justice Department officials in their attempts to pursue
the remedies made available to the Government under the Act. 97
It has been suggested that a more consistent application of liberal
construction rules, focusing solely on the "remedial" objective
of the Act, could remove this confusion. 98 However, congres-
sional intent is arguably both penal and remedial, 99 and such a
use of statutory construction would go beyond interpretation
and become legislation. °0 Rather than rely solely on judicial
construction of the Act to reach fraud in all its modern forms,
Congress must consider implementing additional deterrents to
government program fraud. 10
B. What Constitutes the Requisite State of Mind for Imposing
Liability Under the Act?
Historically, courts have also disagreed about the state of
mind required before liability will be imposed under the False
Claims Act. 0 2 The conflict derives again from confusion about
statutory construction.0 3 Some, emphasizing the "penal" nature
of the statute, define the Act's "knowing" requirement in the
criminal sense, requiring specific intent to defraud the Govern-
" 129 CONG. REc. S9491-92 (daily ed. June 29, 1983) (statement of Sen. Roth
addressing inadequacy of present remedies which limit legal action "to instances where
the Government has suffered a substantial and identifiable monetary loss").
" See Note, supra note 10, at 184-86.
See notes 69-70 supra and accompanying text.
0 See notes 37-42 supra and accompanying text discussing the intent of Congress
as the goal of statutory construction. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
482 (1965) (not the Court's function to "sit as a super-legislature").
See notes 122-78 infra and accompanying text discussing legislative alternatives.
,, This discussion is limited to 31 U.S.C. § 3729(1), (2), (6) (1982). Violations of
subsections (3), (4) and (5) of the Act, and similarly, claims under subsections (1) and
(2) which are alleged to be "fraudulent" as opposed to being merely "false," are not
included in this discussion since there is no question but that "intent to defraud" is an
element of such offenses. See note 29 supra for the text of the statute.
",o Compare United States v. Cooperative Grain & Supply Co., 476 F.2d 47, 58
(8th Cir. 1973) ("The Act is remedial and in plain language covers the submission of a
claim known to be false.") (footnote omitted) with United States v. Shapleigh, 54 F.
126, 134 (8th Cir. 1893) (though civil on its face, the False Claims Act is actually a
criminal statute requiring criminal mens rea before its provisions are violated), and
United States v. Park Motors, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 168, 176-77 (E.D. Tenn. 1952) (intent
to defraud is a necessary prerequisite to liability under the False Claims Act). See
Annot., 26 A.L.R. FED. 307, 311-12 (1976).
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ment.104 Others, focusing on the "remedial" purpose of the
statute, demand only "knowledge of falsity" and reject a re-
quirement of mens rea.'05 One court'06 has even held that negli-
gent misrepresentation may be sufficient to constitute the
necessary "knowledge" required by the Act.'°7 In contrast, courts
emphasizing specific intent require a showing of intentional fraud
or misrepresentation.'0 8
In United States ex rel Hughes v. Cook,'°9 the court set out
what it believed to be the threshold requirement for liability
under the False Claims Act. Giving the statute a "penal" con-
struction, the court required that each "claim" be knowingly
grounded in fraud.Y0 The court defined the essential element of
,', See United States v. Ekelman & Assocs., 532 F.2d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 1976);
Peterson v. Weinberger, 508 F.2d 45, 53 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 830
(1975); United States v. Aerodex, Inc., 469 F.2d 1003, 1007 (5th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Mead, 426 F.2d 118, 122-23 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. National Whole-
salers, 236 F.2d 944, 950 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 930 (1957); United
States ex rel. Hughes v. Cook, 498 F. Supp. 784, 788 (S.D. Miss. 1980); United States
v. Lazy FC Ranch, 324 F. Supp. 698, 700 (D. Idaho 1971), aff'd, 481 F.2d 985 (9th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Klein, 230 F. Supp. 426, 438 (W.D. Pa. 1964), aff'd, 356
F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1966); United States v. Beaty Chevrolet Co., 116 F. Supp. 810, 814
(E.D. Tenn. 1953); Cahill v. Curtis-Wright Corp., 57 F. Supp. 614, 616 (W.D. Ky.
1944).
"5 See United States v. Hughes, 585 F.2d 284, 287 (7th Cir. 1978); Miller v. United
States, 550 F.2d 17, 23 (Ct. Cl. 1977); United States v. Cooperative Grain & Supply
Co., 476 F.2d 47, 57-58 (8th Cir. 1973); Fleming v. United States, 336 F.2d 475, 479
(10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 907 (1965); United States v. Foster Wheeler
Corp., 316 F. Supp. 963, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified in part on other grounds, 447
F.2d 100 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v. Fox Lake State Bank, 240 F. Supp. 720, 723
(N.D. IIl. 1965) aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 366 F.2d 962 (7th Cir.
1966); United States v. Eagle Beef Cloth Co., 235 F. Supp. 491, 492 (E.D.N.Y. 1964);
United States v. Toepleman, 141 F. Supp. 677, 683 (E.D.N.C. 1956), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part on other grounds, 263 F.2d 697 (4th Cir. 1959).
' See United States v. Cooperative Grain & Supply Co., 476 F.2d at 60. See also
Miller v. U.S., 550 F.2d 17, 23 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (extreme negligence on the part of one
who submits a false bill to the Government is within the scope of the proscribed conduct
under former section 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1976)).
'0 See 476 F.2d at 60. The court likened the knowledge requirement to that applied
in a civil suit for misrepresentation. Noting that Prosser classified misrepresentation into
intent, negligence, and strict responsibility, the court reasoned: "[A] representation made
with honest belief in its truth may still be negligent, because of lack of reasonable care
in ascertaining the facts . . .' Id. (citing W. PROSSER, TORTS 719 (2d ed. 1964)).
"' See United States v. Ekelman & Assocs., 532 F.2d at 548; United States v. Ueber,
299 F.2d at 314-15.
" 498 F. Supp. 784 (S.D. Miss. 1980).
See id. at 787 ("[l]ts object was to provide protection against those who would
'cheat the United States.' " (citing United States ex reL Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. at
544)).
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the False Claims Act-scienter-as "personal knowledge of and
personal participation in an attempt to cheat the government."'
While there are several states of mind a False Claims Act
defendant might have," 2 courts have focused their attention on
distinguishing intent to defraud from actual knowledge. Scienter,
as evidenced by the Hughes opinion, involves a specific intent
to " 'cheat' the government;" it is willful and deliberate, not
inadvertent or accidental." 3 Courts understanding the character
of the False Claims Act to be "remedial" and thus civil in
nature do not ask whether there was "ill will" or "specific
intent," but only whether the claimant knew or reasonably should
have known a false claim was being submitted." 4
"1 498 F. Supp. at 787. For a lengthy and technical discussion of the concept of
"knowing" as distinct from intent, see United States v. Cooperative Grain & Supply
Co., 476 F.2d at 58-61.
,"2 Dean Keeton and other commentators have described five possible states of mind
in a misrepresentation case:
(1) Innocent, non-negligent misrepresentation. An example would be a
misrepresentation based on a reasonable belief that the representation was
true.
(2) Negligent misrepresentation. An example would be a representation
based on information that the representor reasonably should have known
was insufficient to be relied upon.
(3) Reckless misrepresentation. An example would be a representation
about a belief without any information that would cause him to have a
genuine belief.
(4) Actual knowledge. An example would be a representation for which
there was some likelihood of its truthfulness, but with the knowledge that
it was probably false.
(5) Intent to defraud. An example would be a representation which was
known to be false and was made with the intent to induce action by
another in reliance.
Adapted from Keeton, Fraud: The Necessity for an Intent to Deceive, 5 UCLA L. REv.
583, 589 (1958) and Campbell, Elements of Recovery under Rule lOB-5: Scienter,
Reliance, and Plaintiff's Reasonable Conduct Requirement, 26 S.C.L. REv. 653, 655-56
(1975).
" 476 F.2d at 58.
,,4 Id. at 59. The Cooperative Grain case provides an excellent illustration of the
subtle distinction between the two views. In that case, defendant grain producers were
being tried under the False Claims Act for submitting false claims for government price
supports to the Commodity Credit Cooperation (CCC). While the purpose of the price
support system is to help producers of commodities, the defendants were purchasing
their grain from another defendant grain elevator rather than delivering grain which
they had produced themselves. They claimed this was done to save time and transport
costs. Id. at 54. However, no purchaser-defendant ever read the government regulations
or the loan contracts informing them of the requirement that only produced grain was
eligible for CCC benefits. Rather, they relied on the advice given them by the manager
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As before, resolution of the conflict turns upon a consistent
interpretation of the purpose and character of the statute. It has
been argued forcefully that the statute is "remedial" and there-
fore should be given a liberal construction, basing liability on
the lower "knowing" state of mind." 5 Similarly, it has also been
argued that in light of the wording of the statute, which bases
liability solely on "knowingly" presenting false or fraudulent
claims, proving "intent to defraud" is extreme." 6 However, the
Ninth Circuit has rejected both the "remedial" approach and
the related semantical approach, opting instead for the "intent
to defraud" standard because common law crimes of fraud
require specific intent." 7 Requiring proof of the highly subjective
"intent to defraud" state of mind"8 places obvious hurdles in
front of any government lawyer trying to build a case under the
of the elevator selling the grain that such a practice was legal. Id.
The district court held that while the defendant's actions were "careless and foolish
in the extreme," they lacked the actual knowledge and intent to deceive required to
impose liability because the defendants failed to understand the government regulations.
Id. at 55.
The Eighth Circuit reversed the lower court on this issue stating that defendants
never even attempted to ask the CCC whether purchased grain was eligible for the price
support. Id. at 60. While the court felt that negligent misrepresentation was sufficient
to meet the "knowing" requirement, here, they noted, defendants had gone beyond
negligence to extreme carelessness. Such a "reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of
a belief" approaches intentional misrepresentation. Id.
W See id. at 58.
'6 See id. See also Acme Process Equip. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 509, 527
n.26 (Ct. Cl. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 385 U.S. 138 (1966) (plain words of the
statute do not require specific intent).
"I See United States v. Mead, 426 F.2d 118, 122-23 (9th Cir. 1970) (court felt
heavy penalties and similarities with common law crimes of fraud required a specific
intent to defraud). But see United States v. Milton, 602 F.2d 231, 233 & n.4 (9th Cir.
1979) (court undermined validity of Mead by holding that intent to defraud was not an
element of criminal fraud).
"' In addition to proving specific intent, some courts place yet another barrier
before the Government by requiring that the standard of proof be the higher than the
norms1 "clear and convincing evidence" standard. See United States v. Ekelman &
Assocs., Inc., 532 F.2d at 548 (gravemen of the action is intentional fraud which the
Government must establish by clear and convincing evidence); United States v. Ueber,
299 F.2d at 314-15 (fraud need not be established beyond a reasonable doubt but more
is required than a mere preponderance.); United States v. Klein, 230 F. Supp. 426, 432
(W.D. Pa. 1964) aff'd 356 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1966) (action based on fraud must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence). See also 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2498, at
424 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981).
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False Claims Act. ' 19 This is not an action at common law but a
statutorily created right of action which plainly covers the sub-
mission of claims "known" to be false.'2 0 Any requirement that
"intent to defraud" be proven only limits the effectiveness of
the Act. However, absent a clear and unequivocal statement by
Congress that the False Claims Act is a civil "remedial" statute,
this confusion will continue.12 1
III. LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVES
A. The False Claims Act
At present, the False Claims Act is a less-than-perfect remedy
for the many kinds of fraud visited upon the United States
Government. Yet, it has served the Nation for over 120 years
and should be amended only after careful consideration. While
private contractors and others who provide the Government with
goods and services should always be assured of due process of
law, the overall purpose of these amendments must be to make
it more feasible for Justice Department officials to pursue future
fraud cases.'22 With these considerations in mind, two amend-
ments are offered.
One way to improve the effectiveness of the Act would be
to ensure that the Government is reimbursed not only for money
or property lost but also for the expense of monitoring and
"I See Program Fraud Civil Penalties Act of 1983: Hearing Before the Comm. on
Governmental Affairs United States Senate on S. 1566, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Hearing] (Prepared statement of J. Paul McGrath, Assistant Attor-
ney Gen., Civil Div., Dept. of Justice: "In our experience, intent requirements in the
civil area lead to confusion and impose an overly-stringent burden upon the Govern-
ment.").
1-1 As the Cooperative Grain case correctly states, "[t]he real issue is what does it
mean 'to know' in order to impose liability." See 476 F.2d at 59.
"I See notes 123-78 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of legislative
solutions to the problem.
1' A Government Accounting Office [hereinafter GAO] study has pointed out that
of the 393 fraud cases referred to the Justice Department, only 28 civil cases were filed.
This prompted the Comptroller General to remark: "[T]he [Justice] Department ha[s]




litigating fraud cases.' 23 Toward this end, the forfeiture provision
should be amended, raising the penalty from $2,000 to at least
$10,000.124 Since the present amount was set in 1863,25 this
increase is only reasonable. 26
A second amendment, proposed in the final days of the
Ninty-eighth Congress, 27 would give the Government the right
to equitable relief in addition to civil penalties and damages.
The offered amendment reads:
A court exercising jurisdiction in a civil action brought under
secton 3730 of this title for an act described in subsection (a)
may order appropriate equitable relief for the Government,
including restitution of money or property, in addition to a
civil penalty and any damages for which a person is liable
under such subsection. 28
I'- One of the primary impediments to the usefulness of the False Claims Act today
is the relative expense of litigating a fraud case. As the Assistant Attorney General has
explained:
Many of the Government's false claims and false statements cases involve
relatively small amounts of money compared to matters normally subject
to litigation. In these cases, litigation in the Federal courts may be eco-
nomically unfeasible because both the actual dollar loss to the Government
and the potential recovery in a civil suit may be exceeded by the Govern-
ment's cost of litigation.
Hearing, supra note 119, at 40 (prepared statement of Mr. J. Paul McGrath, Assistant
Attorney Gen., Civil Div., Dept of Justice). According to GAO estimates, at least 147o
of all fraud cases referred to the Justice Department are declined due to lack of
significant dollar loss. REPORT TO THE CoNGREss, supra note 5, at 29. The same study
indicates that 24076 of the cases are declined due to a lack of sufficient evidence for
prosecution, 16% because the cases lack merit or "jury appeal," 8% because the Justice
Department believes administrative action would be more appropriate, 17% for other
miscellaneous reasons and 20% of the cases are not prosecuted because of "unknown"
reasons. See id.
'" At the close of the second session of the Ninety-eighth Congress, Senator Percy
introduced legislation that would raise the $2,000 statutory forfeiture to $50,000 in civil
cases under 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1982). In criminal cases, his amendment raised the
statutory fine from $10,000 to $100,000. See 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1982). See also S. 3044,
98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. S12749-50 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1984).
' See Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 at 699.
1 The Justice Department strongly endorses this needed amendment though with
some modifications. See Hearing, supra note 119, at 34-35 (testimony of Mr. J. Paul
McGrath, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Div., Dept. of Justice).
I" See S. 3044, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. S12749-50 (daily ed. Oct. 3,
1984) (remarks by Sen. Percy). Note that Senator Percy committed himself to reintrod-
ucing this bill at the beginning of the next session of Congress. However, with his recent
electorial defeat, the likelihood of the bill's reintroduction is in question. See 130 CONG.
REC. S12750.
I- S. 3044, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(b) (1984) (emphasis added).
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According to Senator Percy, the sponsor of this amendment,
such equitable relief would allow the Government to give back
unsatisfactory products and get a refund of money paid. 29 This
"restitution" remedy is especially necessary in the Defense De-
partment's procurement process.3 0 Perhaps, most importantly,
by linking remedies to "restitution," the amendment may be
seen as an expression by Congress that the statute is, in fact,
"remedial," permitting a more comprehensive construction of
the statute.' 3'
Other amendments, including expansion of the definition of
a "claim" to encompass false statements, might be offered. This
would clearly extend the civil provisions of the Act to cover
contingent liabilities such as false statements made on loan in-
surance applications, a2 but it would also overwhelm the Justice
Department with civil cases more expensive to prosecute than
potential recovery would merit. Justice Department officials make
no secret of the fact that, given the Department's limited re-
sources, only "big-dollar" civil claims can be pursued. 3 3 During
a two and one-half year study undertaken by the General Ac-
counting Office [hereinafter GAO], it was discovered that the
Justice Department pursued only sixty-one percent (61%) of all
fraud cases referred to it by federal agencies. 34 Its record in
'9 130 CONG. REC. S12750 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1984).
I 0 See id. The major portion of S. 3044 is an attempt to address the specific kinds
of defense contract fraud. It provides a streamlined administrative remedy for false
claims and statements made in connection with procurement of property and services by
the Department of Defense.
In his statement explaining why the Department of Defense needed its own version
of the False Claims Act, Senator Percy made reference to a prior Senate hearing where
it was uncovered that the Air Force was prepared to pay $9,600 for one allen wrench,
$4,700 for a special piece of wire, and over $10,000 for other small hand held tools.
130 CONG. REC. S12749 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1984).
Note that the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act of 1985 [hereinafter cited PFCRA]
includes within its scope military departments. See S. 1134, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. §
801(a)(1)(6).
"' See notes 43-101 supra and accompanying text discussing the effects of a com-
prehensive "remedial" construction of the False Claims Act as compared with a more
restricted "penal" construction.
"2 See notes 87-93 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of contingent
liabilities.
"I See REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 5, at 30. The Department of Justice
has determined that they will now enphasize prosecuting only those instances of white
collar crime which result in losses of $25,000 or more. See id.
1" See id. at 28. The GAO pointed out that 25% of those claims prosecuted during
the study were under $25,000. Given the new emphasis of the Justice Department, an
even greater percentage of civil cases will be declined. Id. at 30.
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pursuing purely civil remedies was much worse, 35 not because
of a lack of Justice Department prosecutions, but because
''smaller cases ... [those] under $100,000 ... are more difficult
and less cost effective to prosecute."' 136
The GAO concluded that Congress should supplement the
False Claims Act with legislation granting federal agencies the
power -when the Justice Department declines to initiate crimi-
nal or civil actions-to bypass the court system and assess civil
penalties against those who defraud their respective programs. 137
In this manner, agencies can join the fight against fraud by
reaching the small-time operator who has heretofore escaped
prosecution. The Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act of 1985138
[hereinafter PFCRA], recently reintroduced in the 99th Con-
gress, is a response to the GAO recommendation.3 9 Together,
the False Claims Act, amended as suggested above, and the
PFCRA as set forth below, could achieve substantial progress
toward the recovery of lost dollars and the deterrence of future
program fraud.
B. Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act of 1985
This administrative remedy for false, fictitious, or fraudulent
claims and statements made to the United States Government
has much to commend it. It is clearly written and comprehensive
in scope. The stated purpose of the Act, "to provide Federal
agencies . . . with an administrative remedy to recompense...
agencies for losses resulting from [fraudulent] claims and state-
ments," 4° is clearly remedial. This statement is an important
signal to administrative law judges and reviewing courts to broadly
construe the statute. 141
"' See id. at 32. See also note 122 supra.
" Hearing, supra note 119, at 2 (prepared statement of Senator Roth).
See id. at 46-47.
See S. 1134, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S6248-54 (daily ed. May
15, 1985).
"I Chairman Roth, in his remarks introducing S. 1566 (the predecessor to S. 1134)
into the 98th Congress, referred to the conclusions and recommendations of the 1981
GAO report as the general impetus behind the bill. See 129 CONG. REC. S9491 (daily
ed. June 29, 1983).
S. 1134, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(b)(1).
'' See notes 57-101 supra and accompanying text discussing the effect of a com-
prehensive "remedial" construction of the False Claims Act.
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In addition, the bill provides due process protections for all
who are subject to an administrative adjudication. 42 Hearings
at which allegations of false, fictitious, or fraudulent claims or
statements will be reviewed are to be conducted in an impartial
manner consistent with fundamental fairness. 43 Proceedings are
to be conducted in accordance with provisions promulgated by
the agency head' 44 including a detailed record of the hearing
officer's findings and conclusions.145 Should a convicted party
not be satisfied with the determination made by the agency head,
he may still take the matter to court for judicial review. 46
The bill itself can be divided into three general categories:
(1) definitions; (2) remedies; and (3) administrative procedure.
S. 1134, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(b)(2).
'4, S. 1134, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. § 803(f)(2)(G). Fundamental fairness does not
mean that a jury trial must be granted in an administrative proceeding. The United
States Supreme Court most recently addressed the issue of jury trial rights in adminis-
trative proceedings in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977). There, the Court rejected a seventh amendment attack
on the administrative proceedings to prosecute violations of the Occupational Health
and Safety Act (OSHA). The Act allowed OSHA to determine whether an employer
had violated the Act and assess a civil penalty if a violation was found. The Court held
that the seventh amendment merely preserves the right to a jury trial in suits at common
law; it does not prevent Congress from creating new statutory "public" rights which
did not exist in 1789. Id. at 455. In such public rights cases, the Court found that
Congress could constitutionally assign the fact finding function to an administrative
agency "with which a jury trial would be incompatible." Id. Since the PFCRA involves
civil fines and is not tied to a pre-constitutional common law cause of action, the bill
does not appear to be in violation of the seventh amendment. Furthermore, the Court
in Atlas recognized that administrative proceedings were useful and often necessary
alternatives to an already overburdened court system, id. at 455, and emphasized that
"the Seventh Amendment was never intended to establish the jury as the exclusive
mechanism for factfinding in civil cases." Id. at 460.
S. 1566, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., § 803(f)(2)(A)-(G).
S. 1566, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., § 803(g). But see Hearing, supra note 119, at 69
(statement of Jed L. Babbin, V. Pres. & Gen. Counsel, Shipbuilders Council of America).
Babbin complained that § 803(b)(3) merely required that the. agency's decision be in
writing and include "findings and determinations." He argued that such decisions do
not guarantee an adequate record for judicial review. Id.
,46 See S. 1566, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., § 805. Under Section 805, any person held
liable may obtain review by petitioning the appropriate federal circuit court of appeals
within 60 days after notification of liability. § 805(b)(1). The scope of judicial review
by the court with respect to questions of fact shall be one of substantial evidence on
the record considered as a whole. § 805(c). Absent extraordinary circumstances, objec-
tions not raised at the hearing will not be heard by the court, and if any party shows
that material evidence exists which could not reasonably have been presented at the
hearing but is now available, the court will not hear the evidence but will instead remand
the matter back to the administrative tribunal for further consideration. § 805(d). See
also note 165 infra.
1984-1985] FALSE CLAIMS ACT
What follows is a brief analysis of each category, relating its
provisions to the False Claims Act.
1. Definitions. Definitions of key words used in the PFCRA
are found in section 801 .147 Two definitions found in that section
are particularly crucial. The first is the definition of a "claim."' 48
Included in that definition, notably, is any request, demand, or
submission for property or services. Unlike the False Claims
Act, this proposed legislation clearly includes services within its
definition of a claim. 149 Also included is a broad range of gov-
ernment benefits such as grants, loans and reimbursements. 50
Unlike the False Claims Act, the PFCRA also includes false
statements within its liability section.'' Statements are defined
to include any representation made with respect to claims, con-
tracts, bids, proposals, applications for insurance or even appli-
cations for employment. 5 2 The inclusion of false statements
within the liability section of the Act renders moot the question
whether a contingent liability induced by a misrepresentation
made in the application process is actionable.'53 Clearly, such
statements violate the Act and are subject to the forfeiture
provisions.
To be held liable under the PFCRA, as with the False Claims
Act, a party must know or have reason to know that a false
', See S. 1134, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. at § 801.
S. 1134, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 801(a)(3)(A).
See notes 94-96 supra and accompanying text for a discussion concerning services
under the False Claims Act.
V1, See S. 1134, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., § 801(a)(3)(B)(ii). The PFCRA would also
extend liability to include the submission of false applications for feed and grain. §
801(a)(3XA). See note 96 supra and accompanying text.
S. 1134, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., § 801(a)(4) provides in part:
(4) 'statement' means any written representation, certification, document,
record, or accounting or bookkeeping entry-
(A) with respect to a claim; or
(B) with respect to-
(i) a contract with, or a bid or proposal for a contract with,
(ii) a grant, loan, or benefit from
(iii) an application for insurance from, or
(iv) an application for employment with, an authority .....
S . 1134, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 802(a)(4).
'" See notes 87-93 supra. At present, such statements are covered by 18 U.S.C. §
1001 (1982), the Criminal False Statements Act; but, as is the case under the civil
provisions of the False Claims Act, such smaller cases are often more difficult and less
cost effective to prosecute. See note 136 supra and accompanying text.
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claim or statement has been made.' 4 The PFCRA states une-
quivocally that for purposes of assessing liability, the claim'55 or
statement 156 need only be shown to be false, fictitious, or fraud-
ulent. By choosing the disjunctive "or," the PFCPA evidences
a clear choice to reach acts done "knowingly" but without
requiring "intent to defraud."1 57
Finally, it should be noted that the PFCRA assesses penalties
only where there have been material violations of a contract.
While earlier versions of the PFCRA considered a claim to be
false when in violation of any applicable federal or state statute
or regulation," 8 this language has been deleted from the most
recent version of the Act in order to avoid holding defendants
liable for technical, immaterial violations. 159 Similarly, included
in the liability section related to false statements are those as-
sertions or omissions of a material fact which are false, fictitious,
or fraudulent. 160 Hence, it can no longer be argued, as some
have, that the PFCRA eliminates the element of materiality.16'
' S. 1134, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 802(a)(1), (2).
S. 1134, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 802(a)(1).
S. 1134, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., § 802(a)(2).
'" It is apparently the opinion of the Government Affairs Committee that the
adoption of the "intent to defraud" standard "would substantially dilute the effective-
ness of the statute. It is closely akin to a criminal mens rea that is inappropriate for an
administrative tribunal ... the Committee believes that the knowing or knowledge
standard is preferred." Knowledge v. Specific Intent, 3-4 (unpublished draft language
for committee report, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee). See notes 102-21 supra
and accompanying text for a complete discussion of the knowledge v. intent debate.
'15 S. 1566, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., § 802(a)(1)(B). The language "or as provided in
violation of any applicable federal or state statute or regulation" has been deleted from
the bill. See § 802(a)(1)(B).
,.9 Status of Amendments Adopted, at 1 (unpublished committee report)("This
amendment deletes language that would cause this legislation to apply to cases involving
technical violations of non-material parts of a contract.").
- See S. 1134, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., § 802(a)(2)(A)-(B).
,6, Responding to an earlier version of the PFCRA, one contractor presented an
excellent example of an immaterial misrepresentation. Noting that former § 802(a)(1)(B)
considered claims for payment in violation of state or federal regulations to be within
the definition of a false claim, the contractor posed the situation where a manufacturer
under contract with the government who is in violation of some OSHA regulation might
be held liable under the PFCPA even though compliance with that regulation was
immaterial to the transaction. See Hearing, supra note 119, at 65-67 (statement of Jed
L. Babbin, V. Pres. & Gen. Counsel, Shipbuilders Council of America). Apparently, in
response to that argument, a materiality element has now been read into the PFCRA
by § 802(a)(3) when it is stated that no person shall be held liable for a claim or
statement made mistakenly or inadvertently. See note 159 supra.
FALSE CLAns ACT
2. Remedies. The remedies provisions of the PFCRA pro-
vide that in addition to any remedy at law, there shall be a
$10,000 forfeiture for each false claim or statement made. 162
Additionally, if there is a false claim made, then there can be
awarded double damages calculated with respect to either the
value of property or services delivered or the amount of damages
suffered. 63 As a former United States Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral has pointed out, these provisions make clear the restitution-
ary goal of the statute, clarifying the purpose of the bill as
"remedial" and necessary to "facilitate the recovery of public
funds lost through fraudulent conduct.' ' 64 As a result, admin-
istrative law judges and reviewing courts can be confident that
Congress intends that the PFCRA be given a broad construction.
At the same time, the substantial civil penalties provide a for-
midable deterrent to future program fraud.
3. Administrative Procedure. Section 803 of the bill pro-
vides for a hearing to be conducted on the record 65 regarding
liability under the PFCPA. For purposes of the hearing, the
agency official bringing the allegations need only prove the
liability of the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence.166
Here is yet another substantial departure from the common law
requirements that plague the False Claims Act. 167 The higher
"clear and convincing" standard which has been judicially im-
posed on the False Claims Act requires more evidence from the
plaintiff than does a normal civil action. 68 The lower "prepon-
derance" standard more accurately reflects the "remedial" and
civil nature of the agency proceeding.
Prior to proceeding under the PFCRA, the agency head must
submit to the United States Attorney General a notice of inten-
162 S. 1134, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., § 802(a)(1), (2). If no damages result before the
false statement or claim is discovered then the agency is entitled to a $10,000 statutory
forfeiture for each violation in the same manner as allowed by the False Claims Act.
See note 93 supra.
I6 S. 1134, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 802 (a)(1).
" Hearing, supra note 119, at 47 (prepared statement by J. Paul McGrath, As-
sistant Attorney Gen., Civil Div., Dept. of Justice).
S. 1134, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., § 803(e).
S. 1134, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., § 803(e).
'' See note 118 supra for a discussion of the clear and convincing standard of
proof often applied under the False Claims Act.
16, Qui Tam Actions, supra note 14, at 792.
1984-1985]
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
tion to proceed. 169 If the United States Attorney General ap-
proves of the action or takes no action within ninety (90) days,
then the agency is allowed to proceed. 70 However, at no time
will an agency be allowed to commence an action under the
provisions of the PFCRA if the amount fraudulently taken from
the Government exceeds $100,000.171 This provision underscores
the need for an expeditious administrative alternative. 72 Once
claims approach the jurisdictional limit of the PFCRA, it is
more likely that the False Claims Act will provide adequate relief
and hence more likely that the Justice Department will com-
mence its own action. 7 3
Finally, 74 the United States Attorney General is responsible
for the enforcement of any penalty or assessment imposed under
the PFCRA.' 75 To do so, the Justice Department is required to
bring a civil action in federal district court, 17 6 but the defendant
will be disallowed from raising as a defense any matters that
were raised or could have been raised in the section 803 hear-
ing. 177 After either enforcement action or judicial review has
been initiated, only the United States Attorney General may
settle or compromise any penalty.7 8
CONCLUSION
Fraud is an indisputable reality which results in the loss of
millions of tax dollars each year while also eroding the public's
confidence in the Government's ability to efficiently carry out
its programs. At present, the False Claims Act is the primary
weapon against fraud, providing civil penalties to restore lost
,51 S. 1134, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., § 803(b)(1). Such written notice must also outline
the reasons behind the agency's decision to proceed. See § 803(b)(1).
I 0 S. 1134, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., § 803(a)(2)(1), (2).
S. 1134, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., § 803(c)(1), (2).
See 129 CONG. REC. S9491 (daily ed. June 29, 1983).
" REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, supra note 5, at 30. (Justice Department priorities
favor actions involving amounts over $25,000).
"I The PFCRA also contains several technical sections governing subpoena power,
the right to set off, agencies regulations, and reports but these provisions and the issues
presented by them are beyond the scope of this Note.
57 S. 1134, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., § 806(a).
176 S. 1134, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., § 806(b)-(c).
57 S. 1134, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., § 806(b). Nor may the defendant raise these
issues as a defense in a review pursuant to § 805. § 806(b). See also note 146 supra.
7A S. 1134, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., § 806(t).
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funds and to deter future illegal activity. Unfortunately, courts
have been baffled by this civil statute which assesses penalties
for acts also punishable as crimes. Even though the Act has now
been separated from its criminal counterparts, courts continue
to be confused about how to interpret its provisions.
Some of the confusion may be solved by a more consistent
focus on the "remedial" character of the Act, but judicial
statutory construction is a limited device that should never ex-
ceed the limits placed upon it by congressional intent. What is
needed is a new expression of the will of Congress. The Act
itself must be amended. In addition, administrative remedies for
smaller instances of fraud must be adopted through the passage
of the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act. Together, the False
Claims Act and the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act could
be a powerful sword in the hands of administrative agencies and
the Justice Department. Perhaps with these two mechanisms for
combatting fraud firmly in place, Congress could get on with
the real test-restoring the public's faith in its ability to manage
its programs.
Alexander M. Waldrop
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